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With the specter of a new farm bill on the horizon, con-
siderable discussion is occurring concerning the possible
redirection of conservation programming and financing.
Notably, interest in the increased use of incentive systems
and market-like instruments continues to expand. One
source of this interest lies in the desire to shift some of the
burden of providing ecosystem services, such as protecting
stream and river channels from erosion, maintaining
biodiversity, and providing clean water and air, to private
sector pockets. For example, in the fall of 2006, USDA
and EPA announced a joint partnership to support
expanded water quality credit trading for nutrients in the
Chesapeake Bay watershed, allowing farmers to receive
compensation for water quality improvements. Carbon
markets, such as the active program in the European
Union, are also being discussed as a possible model for
expanded market-like programs in agricultural conserva-
tion policy.
While the potential cost effectiveness of providing
environmental goods from incentive-based methods
appears to be broadly understood, there is an additional
attribute that is less broadly acknowledged: due to numer-
ous inter-linkages in natural ecosystems, the development
of a market that provides one ecosystem service may sig-
nificantly change the level of provision of other ecosystem
services. Thus, by developing the institutional structure to
support and encourage the provision of one ecosystem ser-
vice, changes, either positive or negative, in other services
may result. 
The example we consider here is the case in which a
carbon market that would allow U.S. farmers to receive
payment for sequestering carbon when they retire land
from production is implemented. This could occur if the
United States were to unilaterally implement such a mar-
ket, or if at some future time the United States chose to
sign on to a Kyoto-like accord, where carbon sinks were
allowed to generate credits that could be traded to meet
mandatory carbon reduction requirements. Under such a
scenario, land retirement decisions would be driven by the
prices paid for carbon and the amount of carbon that a
particular parcel could sequester (we abstract from the
important question of measuring the carbon storage
potential of each parcel  see the excellent work of Mooney
et al., 2004).
Removing a parcel of land from production will
change the suite of environmental benefits associated with
the parcel. In many cases, these effects are likely to be pos-
itive  for example, taking land out of active agricultural
production and placing it in perennial cover or forested
lands will usually yield reduced erosion and nutrient run-
off relative to row crop agriculture. Indeed, the findings of
our study are consistent with this outcome. However, if
conservation practices are already in place on a working
land field, water quality improvements from retiring the
land might be small and, in fact, could be negative. The
latter could occur if land retirement results in the planting
of land cover that, on the whole, is not as effective in cap-
turing nutrients and sediments as a working land system
that already has effective conservation practices and man-
agement in place. 
In this paper, we consider the possible water quality
consequences of a carbon trading policy that allows farm-
ers to receive carbon credits from retiring their land from
agricultural production. To do so, we make a number of
simplifying assumptions about the structure of the carbon
market and the choices farmers make in response to the98 CHOICES 2nd Quarter 2007 • 22(2)
existence of that market; many of
these assumptions may not, in fact,
represent how an actual market
might be implemented. Rather than
view the results of this analysis as
definitive, we present the findings in
the spirit of raising awareness of the
potential environmental conse-
quences that can occur when a single
environmental benefit or target (car-
bon sequestration) forms the basis of
environmental policy, as would be
the case if carbon trading markets
that allowed land retirement to yield
carbon credits were functioning with
high carbon prices.
A Bit about Our Data and Models
To develop our models, we draw
heavily from the National Resource
Inventory to provide data on the land
use, cropping history, and farming
practices in the state of Iowa. This
inventory is the most comprehensive
data set on land use in the United
States, and we use data on the 14,472
physical points in Iowa that represent
cropland. Conceptually, our data and
models are based on individual pro-
ducer and farm-level behavior, and
we treat an NRI point as a producer
with a farm size equal to the number
of acres represented by the point (the
expansion factor provided by the sur-
vey). Figure 1 illustrates the 35
watersheds corresponding to the
United States Geological Survey 8-
digit Hydrologic Cataloging Units
that are largely contained in the state
and are modeled in this study. To
compute the amount of carbon
sequestered when a land unit is
retired from cropland, we rely on
estimates from the Environmental
Policy Integrated Climate Model ver-
sion 3060. When land is retired from
crop production, we assume that
annual grasses are planted and main-
tained on the land, and we run a 30-
year simulation to predict the carbon
sequestration level associated with
this change. 
In addition, we also rely on esti-
mates from a watershed-based model
to assess the conservation policies.
Unlike carbon sequestration, the
degree to which land retirement
improves in-stream water quality
depends on critical interactions
between land uses in different loca-
tions within a watershed. Thus, for
otherwise identical tracts of land,
more water quality improvement
may occur from retiring a piece of
land from production that is located
downstream from numerous other
cropped points relative to one that is
not. The potential filtering effect is
just one example of the physical pro-
cesses that need to be captured to
assess the in-stream water quality
effects of land retirement. 
So that we can capture these land
use interactions within a watershed
setting, we employ the Soil and
Water Assessment Tool, a biophysical
water quality model, to estimate
changes in nitrogen, phosphorous,
and sediment loads from retiring a
particular set of parcels from produc-
tion within a watershed. To estimate
the in-stream water quality conse-
quences of the increase in land set
a s i d e ,  w e  h a v e  c a librated the water
quality model for each of the water-
sheds identified in Figure 1 to base-
line levels (Jha et al., 2005; Gassman
et al., 2005). By running the model
at the set-aside levels “after” the pol-
icy, we can compute the changes in
water quality attributable to the
increase in land set-aside. The water-
sheds studied correspond to 13 out-
lets, at which the in-stream water
quality is measured. The water qual-
ity measures of interest are sediment,
nitrogen, and phosphorus. 
Water Quality Effects of a Carbon 
Market
To demonstrate the possible conse-
quences of a carbon market that pays
farmers for the sequestration of car-
bon in agricultural soils on water
quality, we consider a simple sce-
nario. Suppose that through an active
carbon market, the price of carbon is
such that about 10% of Iowa crop-
Figure 1. Study area and watershed delineations.2nd Quarter 2007 • 22(2) CHOICES 99
land is retired; suppose further that
the cost of retiring all land within the
state is about the same. While rental
rates for farmland do vary across the
state, they vary relatively little with
respect to productivity (see Secchi &
Babcock, forthcoming), and this sim-
plifying assumption allows us to
focus on environmental outcomes of
the scenario without overly compli-
cating the analysis. Under these
assumptions, the cropland that will
be removed from production will be
the land that produces the highest
carbon sequestration benefits per acre
as this land will earn the highest
return from carbon sequestration
credits. In consequence, the land
removed from production may or
may not represent significant por-
tions of the watersheds under consid-
eration.
Based on this scenario, the land
retired would be focused in the cen-
tral part of Iowa, in the ecoregion
known as the Des Moines Lobe, a flat
area, with very productive agriculture
and particularly suited for carbon
sequestration. Figure 2 illustrates the
quantity and location of the carbon
that the carbon simulation model
predicts would be sequestered across
the state under this scenario. Approx-
imately 2 million acres of land is
removed from production under this
scenario with about 2.7 million tons
of carbon being sequestered annually.
Does this land retirement,
induced by a private market that pays
for ecosystem services, yield other
environmental benefits to the region?
To answer this question, we estimate
the in-stream water quality effects of
this land retirement using the water
quality model and present the per-
centage reductions in three common
indicators in Figures 3-5. 
Figure 3 reports the estimated in-
stream sediment reductions from the
retirement of this set of land parcels.
We find that for the two largest
watersheds whose sediment dynamics
is influenced by the presence of large
reservoirs, the Des Moines and Iowa
River watersheds, there is only a little
improvement in sediment. In con-
trast, there are larger reductions in
sediment in the South-Western part
of the state, likely because the land
that is retired from production there
is more erodible. In general, however,
sediment reductions in percentage
terms are lower than the reductions
in nutrients, because land that has
high carbon sequestration potential
also has good productivity levels and
is, therefore, more heavily fertilized.
Figure 2. Carbon sequestration from carbon trading.
Figure 3. In-stream sediment changes from carbon trading (percentage
reduction).100 CHOICES 2nd Quarter 2007 • 22(2)
The retirement of land generally
improves the total N level as seen in
Figure 4. The reason for the
improved N levels in many cases, as
mentioned above, is that the land
taken out of production is largely
prime agricultural land: heavily fertil-
ized and reliant on tiled drainage sys-
tems. Some of the highest reductions,
a total of over 10,000 tons annual
average, are in the Des Moines River
watershed, which comprises large
parts of the Des Moines Lobe and
includes some of the most productive
land in the state where most of the
acres of land retirement are located. 
Finally, Figure 5 reports the
results for the in-stream phosphorous
levels predicted to occur as a result of
the carbon trading program. Like the
sediment results, the Western water-
sheds show the highest improve-
ments. This is not surprising given
the sediment results, since phospho-
rous typically moves with sediment.
The development of more mar-
ket-like programs to provide ecosys-
tem services from agriculture is a
concept with expanding interest. In
this paper, we have identified an
additional issue associated with this
strategy, changes in other environ-
mental goods of interest. In the case
analyzed here, these changes were all
positive; thus, the market-based sys-
tem yields positive gains for other
ecosystem services. By recognizing
that a system that pays for carbon
sequestration via land retirement
potentially has effects on other envi-
ronmental services, and that the spa-
tial distribution of different environ-
mental services is likely to differ,
policy makers can incorporate these
effects in planning and implementing
markets for ecosystem services.
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